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Introduction 
 
 
Russia’s Armed Forces on 
Modernisation Course 
Progress and Perspectives of Military Reform 
Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester 
In 2008 Russia’s Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov launched a mammoth project of 
comprehensive military reforms, whose objectives his successor Sergei Shoigu has also 
upheld since his November 2012 appointment. Despite deficits in recruitment, equip-
ment and funding, Moscow’s armed forces have already accomplished the organisa-
tional transition from mass mobilisation army to modern combat force. Although the 
reforms will not fundamentally change the balance of power with the United States, 
increased military muscle-flexing vis-à-vis Europe must be expected. Above all, however, 
the reforms expand Moscow’s ability to project power in the post-Soviet space and mili-
tarily reinforce Putin’s efforts to tie that region more closely to Russia. 
 
In October 2008, immediately after the 
Russia-Georgia War exposed serious deficits 
in the Russian armed forces, Moscow ini-
tiated the most sweeping military reforms 
for decades. The Russian leadership was 
seeking nothing less than massive mod-
ernisation of an army that was still to a 
large extent orientated on the concept of 
mass mobilisation. For conventional forces 
in particular this involves deep changes in 
organisation and concept as well as weap-
onry and personnel. 
Until November 2012, Defence Minister 
Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General 
Staff Nikolai Makarov vigorously imple-
mented central elements of the reforms. 
This caused conflicts, including with the 
officer corps, which was reduced by one 
third, and with the arms industry, towards 
which the reformers adopted a tougher 
stance. Serdyukov’s dismissal on 6 Novem-
ber 2012 is therefore likely to have had 
deeper reasons than the officially cited 
corruption investigations against Oboron-
servis, a commercial enterprise under the 
Defence Ministry. 
As his successor, Vladimir Putin ap-
pointed the former Minister for Emergency 
Situations and governor of the Moscow 
region, Sergei Shoigu, a popular politician 
and capable manager. Now that Shoigu has 
been in office for a little more than a year, 
the question arises whether he has altered 
the reform agenda and if so how. Where 
can successes and failures be identified in 
the implementation of the original targets? 
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And what are the repercussions of the mili-
tary reform project on Russia’s foreign and 
security policy? 
A New Style of Leadership  
The first clearly visible sign of change is 
the leadership style in the defence ministry. 
Shoigu’s predecessor Serdyukov only partly 
succeeded in communicating the goals and 
necessity of the reforms internally, espe-
cially to critics in the ranks of the military 
leadership. In contrast to his predecessors, 
whose professional experience was based 
on a career in the armed forces or intelli-
gence services, Serdyukov was in the first 
place an economist. As the former head of 
the Russian tax service he stood outside the 
military leadership networks. While this 
allowed him to push through the radical 
organisational transformation even against 
their resistance, the loss of military con-
fidence in the ministerial leadership im-
paired the implementation of the reform 
project. 
Sergei Shoigu recognised the associated 
problems and has been working to repair 
the damaged relationship, also making 
symbolic gestures underlining his respect 
for military culture. For example, he wears 
the uniform of an army general, reversed 
the dissolution of historic regiments and 
reinstated critics dismissed by Serdyukov. 
In contrast to Serdyukov, Shoigu cam-
paigns energetically within the army for 
support for the reforms. He also draws 
more heavily on military expertise in his 
decision-making, as evidenced by the grow-
ing number deputy ministers from military 
backgrounds. He also removed the civilian 
officials from the tax service that his pre-
decessor had appointed to top ministerial 
posts, who were extremely unpopular in 
large parts of the officer corps. 
But the rapprochement with the military 
leadership is a tightrope walk for Shoigu. 
It remains to be seen whether he can pre-
serve the autonomy he will need to impose 
decisions that contradict military opinion. 
There is certainly no shortage of decisions 
to be made, as central reforms ultimately 
remained unfinished under Serdyukov. 
Structural Reorganisation of the 
Armed Forces 
Organisational change is one of the areas 
where most progress has been made. It 
seals the fate of the mass mobilisation army 
designed for large-scale war with NATO and 
lays the foundations for creating modern 
armed forces that can be deployed rapidly 
and flexibly in local and regional conflicts. 
To this end all the “skeleton units” were 
disbanded by December 2009. In the event 
of mobilisation they would have required 
up to a year to attain full strength and 
materiel readiness. The overall size of the 
army shrank nominally from 1.13 million 
to 1 million men, and the planned num-
ber of reservists from about 20 million to 
just 700,000. The cumbersome divisions 
intended for fighting on a long front line 
were also disbanded by December 2009, 
replaced instead by smaller more rapidly 
deployable brigades that are to be in “per-
manent readiness” even in peacetime, mean-
ing fully staffed, trained and equipped. And 
finally, the military command structure 
has been thoroughly overhauled. While the 
Russian army was still following a twenti-
eth-century operational concept in Georgia 
in 2008, with army and air force operating 
largely uncoordinatedly, enabling joint 
operations is now a key goal of the reform-
ers. To this end four strategic commands 
were set up by late 2010 (West, East, South, 
Centre). Each controls all units of all armed 
services stationed in its area as well as 
the other armed organs (Interior Ministry, 
Emergency Situations Ministry, border 
troops), with the exception of the strategic 
missile forces. 
Important organisational foundations 
for the “new face” of the Russian armed 
forces had thus already been established 
under Serdyukov. Shoigu is building on 
that and also setting new priorities in-
cluding expanding special capabilities. In 
March 2013 it was announced that Russia 
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would set up a “Special Operations Com-
mand”, and according to media reports the 
founding of a “Cyber Command” is also 
imminent. 
The Special Operations Command serves 
to intervene as rapidly as possible in local 
conflicts and countering terrorism, drug 
trafficking and insurgency. It is a reflection 
of concern about the unstable situation in 
the Northern Caucasus and fears that the 
ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan could 
lead to negative spillover effects in the 
neighbouring Central Asian countries. The 
role of the Cyber Command is to conduct 
“information warfare” in virtual space. 
Alongside real capability expansion, the 
founding of these two commands also has 
symbolic character, as it creates a kind of 
organisational parity with the United States 
and China. 
Testing Operational Readiness 
The new structures and deployment con-
cepts are indispensable, but only the first 
step on the road to a modernisation. In a 
second step they must be tested and prac-
tised. This was one focus of military 
activities in 2013. 
In addition to the scheduled exercises of 
the summer and winter training cycle, the 
Defence Ministry concentrated in partic-
ular on a series of unscheduled operations. 
These included the largest manoeuvre of 
the post-Soviet era, involving about 160,000 
soldiers in the Eastern Military District 
from 13 to 20 July 2013. 
The spring exercises concentrated above 
all on highly mobile crisis response units 
with highly developed capabilities for fight-
ing unconventional adversaries such as 
insurgents and terrorists. The summer and 
autumn manoeuvres, on the other hand, 
followed conventional scenarios. This 
applies for example to the Zapad (West) 
series of exercises in September 2013, in 
which about 12,000 Russian and 10,000 
Belarussian soldiers took part. 
In almost all manoeuvres the partici-
pating forces demonstrated improved per-
formance. Most succeeded is attaining 
combat readiness within no more than 
fourteen days, completing marches across 
sometimes strategic distances and there-
after mastering branch-specific tasks. Just 
five years ago such challenges would have 
overstretched most units’ personnel and 
materiel. 
Weaknesses were identified above all in 
individual training of soldiers. The Chief of 
the General Staff complained in April 2013 
that many drivers could not control their 
vehicles properly and that officers were in-
capable of operating the new command 
and control system. Increases in malfunc-
tions and failures in the air and ground 
forces were partly due to equipment defi-
cits, he said, but above all to operator error. 
Recruitment Problems 
This points to a fundamental problem of 
the Russian armed forces. In order to mod-
ernise comprehensively, increased profes-
sionalisation would be the logical conse-
quence, if not indeed a transition to a pro-
fessional army. Serdyukov adopted that 
argumentation and decreed a target of 
recruiting 499,000 kontraktniki (enlisted 
soldiers) by 2017. Shoigu is adhering to that 
goal, and facing similar challenges to his 
predecessor: 
Firstly, a career as soldier is not very 
attractive. On the one hand, this has socio-
economic causes. Although pay was more 
than doubled in January 2012, bonuses 
and immaterial benefits were abolished in 
return. On the other, the reforms appear 
not to have fundamentally improved the 
morale of the armed forces. This is not only 
because of the dissolution and reorganisa-
tion of units, but also incisive changes in 
leadership structure. The officer corps was 
reduced by one third to 220,000 and the 
140,000 warrant officers (praporščiki/mič-
mani) completely abolished. But there is a 
lack of adequate replacement in the shape 
of career NCOs. As a result the internal 
cohesion and discipline of units suffers: the 
absolute number of crimes committed has 
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not fallen since 2008 even as the size of the 
army has fallen, while the dedovshchina sys-
tem of bullying and violence against young 
conscripts continues nearly unabated. 
Secondly, the army competes with other 
armed organs for new personnel, further 
complicating the planned recruitment of 
499,000 kontraktniki. Apart from the Defence 
Ministry, the Interior Ministry and Emer-
gency Situations Ministry also maintain 
large armed formations whose recruitment 
needs are not insignificant. In the Interior 
Ministry alone 170,000 military posts are to 
be professionalised by 2015. 
Against this background, thirdly, demo-
graphic developments weigh heavily. The 
number of male eighteen-year-olds is set to 
fall from 1.1 million (2007) to a forecast 
630,000 by 2017, of whom on average only 
two thirds will be fit to serve. Under these 
circumstances it will be difficult to both fill 
the depleted ranks of the kontraktniki and 
recruit 220,000 conscripts annually. For 
years already more than 20 percent of all 
military posts have remained unfilled. 
The political leadership has limited short-
term options for improving this critical 
situation. One of these would be to dras-
tically increase the number of conscripts. 
Given that domestic political calculus 
precludes their period of service being 
extended beyond twelve months, the only 
remaining option is to expand the recruit-
ment pool. Complementing Serdyukov’s 
approach of reducing the grounds for 
exemptions, Shoigu increased national 
conscription quotas at the beginning of 
2013, even for North Caucasian ethnic 
groups that are regarded as a security risk. 
In parallel the Defence Ministry is seeking 
to improve public attitudes towards mili-
tary service. Serdyukov had already im-
proved conditions for the conscripts, who 
are now permitted to use mobile phones 
in the barracks and leave at weekends. Serd-
yukov’s successor introduced additional 
qualification opportunities. Under a legal 
amendment, from January 2014 conscripts 
will be able to complete an additional voca-
tional qualification funded out of the fed-
eral budget. However, the service varies 
regionally and individual wishes cannot 
always be satisfied. 
Other measures to improve the accep-
tance of military service concentrate on 
traditional instruments of ideological in-
fluence. The Soviet-era state-subsidised 
Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the 
Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF) is to 
intensify its para-military training efforts. 
Fostering patriotism remains a cornerstone. 
Ambitious Armaments Programme 
Alongside organisational and personnel 
changes, improving equipment and weap-
onry is another core element of the military 
reforms. In 2008 only 10 percent of weap-
ons systems satisfied modern standards; 
that share is to increase to 70 percent by 
2020. As well as replacing outdated aircraft, 
vehicles and naval vessels, this means above 
all procuring precision weapons and auto-
mated command systems. Only then can 
the qualitative leap to network-centric oper-
ations be accomplished. 
Whether this succeeds will depend deci-
sively on the innovation and production 
capacity of the Russian defence industry. 
Although it has been able to achieve indi-
vidual modernisation successes, such as the 
Iskander short-range ballistic missile, the 
Armata modular platform for armoured 
vehicles and the SU-35 fighter, the defence 
industry complex still suffers from a lack 
of innovation. Its staff and production facil-
ities are outdated, while central planning 
relicts and corrupt structures do the rest. 
For these reasons the arms industry still 
often fails to meet the needs of the armed 
forces and/or delivers late. For example, the 
long-planned introduction of an automated 
command and control system (ESU TZ) has 
repeatedly been postponed, and the sorry 
story of this prestige project is no isolated 
case. Only 15 to 20 percent of all procure-
ment projects planned for the first half of 
2013 were completed on time. 
Former Defence Minister Serdyukov took 
a hard line in negotiations with the defence 
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industry, criticising poor quality and high 
prices, insisting on strict cost controls 
and abandoning preferential treatment of 
domestic producers. Foreign firms are now 
increasingly included in procurement ten-
ders, leading for example to helicopters 
being purchased from France and wheeled 
vehicles from Italy. The resulting conflicts 
between Defence Ministry and defence 
industry likely contributed to Serdyukov’s 
fall. 
His successor Shoigu softened the con-
frontative stance towards the military-
industrial complex. This partly reflects 
altered political circumstances, where the 
defence industry occupies a central role in 
Putin’s ambitions for economic modernisa-
tion as a potential motor for other sectors. 
Domestic producers are therefore again 
given preference in tendering. Putin also 
reshuffled government responsibilities, 
putting the military-industrial commission 
headed by the nationalist populist Dmitry 
Rogozin in charge of procurement pricing 
rather than the Defence Ministry. This does 
nothing, however, to rectify the arms indus-
try’s structural deficits such as poor inno-
vation and ageing staff. 
Questions over Funding 
The success of the reform project depends 
not only on overcoming technological and 
demographic problems. Adequate and sus-
tainable funding is just as necessary. The 
military budget is indeed being signifi-
cantly increased. By 2016 the budget item 
“national defence” is to increase by 60 per-
cent from 2,098 billion rubels (€47 billion) 
to 3,377 billion rubels (€75 billion). At the 
same time Russia plans to spend 23,000 bil-
lion rubels (€515 billion) on military equip-
ment by 2020. Yet even if the figures appear 
impressive, it remains unclear whether 
these investments will be adequate. 
Firstly, it must be remembered that 
the reforms consist of many parts that are 
closely interlinked and must therefore be 
tackled in concert. These include recruit-
ment and adequate pay as well as training 
and exercises. But the biggest cost driver 
is procurement. Because the nuclear forces 
continue to enjoy priority for political 
(security) and symbolic reasons, the means 
for the urgently needed modernisation of 
conventional forces are constrained. It is 
estimated that about 40 percent of state 
arms spending goes on nuclear capabilities. 
Secondly, it must be assumed that a large 
proportion of the budget is embezzled. 
According to the Russian military prose-
cutor 20 percent of the defence budget 
vanishes that way each year. Thirdly, there 
is a fundamental tension between social 
and military spending. Although major 
investments are needed in health and edu-
cation, their share of GDP will probably fall 
from 4.0 to 2.2 percent and 5.1 to 3.9 per-
cent respectively between 2013 and 2016. 
On the other hand the defence budget’s 
share will increase in the same period from 
3.2 to an estimated 3.8 percent of GDP. In 
view of stagnating economic growth and a 
one-sided orientation and dependency on 
fluctuating energy revenues, this conflict 
of goals is likely to sharpen in future. These 
difficulties are so grave as to put a question 
mark over whether the ambitious military 
reforms can be adequately funded in the 
long term. 
Foreign and Security Policy 
Implications of Military Reforms 
Russia’s armed forces are still heading on 
a modernisation course. At the organisa-
tional and conceptual level the transition 
to an effective modern combat army has 
already been successfully accomplished. 
Nonetheless, problems still remain in 
recruitment, equipment and funding, as 
well as open questions for example on 
the future of conscription. 
These impact to differing degrees on 
Moscow’s capability to rebuff security 
threats and project power. Russia is hardly 
going to close the technology gap with the 
United States in the medium term. Its 
ability to intervene at the global scale also 
remains limited, lacking as it does a deploy-
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able carrier group and a global network 
of military bases, and making only slow 
progress on the development of long-range 
conventional precision weapons. Moscow 
will therefore continue to prioritise its 
strategic nuclear forces, which serve as a 
symbol of parity with the United States 
and an instrument of deterrence not 
only against a nuclear first strike but also 
against large-scale conventional attack. 
However, where the European NATO 
states are concerned, the military reforms 
bring a slight growth in Russian power. 
This is amplified by the persistent Euro-
pean trend of falling national defence 
spending and shrinking armed forces. In 
view of this, Russia might be tempted to 
make greater use of its armed forces to 
assert its interests and resort to demon-
strations of power, provocations and open 
threats. These include violations of Swedish 
and Finnish airspace, the announced sta-
tioning of Iskander short-range ballistic 
missiles in Kaliningrad in the event of a 
NATO missile defence complex being estab-
lished in Poland, or the Zapad exercise 
series that in 2009 simulated a nuclear 
strike on Poland and in 2013 concentrated 
on repelling an attack by “Baltic terrorists”. 
Political considerations mean that the 
“strategic partner” China does not feature 
as a military threat in any official Russian 
document. Nonetheless it appears to be 
becoming increasingly important for the 
direction of military reforms, as indicated 
by the fact that the Eastern Military District 
has been equipped with enhanced modern 
weaponry and its capabilities for large-scale 
inter-state confrontation maintained. 
That said, the reformers are principally 
looking to the post-Soviet space. That is 
where Moscow’s most critical security chal-
lenges lie: ethnoterritorial and religious 
conflicts in the Caucasus (Karabakh, South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia) and Central Asia, as well 
as Transnistria, and trans-national risks 
such as drug smuggling and terrorism. It 
is also in this region that the will to project 
power is strongest. In his third term Putin 
strengthened efforts to tie the “zone of 
privileged interests” to Russia through 
economic, political and military integra-
tion projects such as the Customs Union, 
the Eurasian Union and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation. If Moscow 
succeeds in positioning itself as the guar-
antor of security in the post-Soviet space, 
it could gain greater acceptance and legit-
imacy for its regional hegemony projects. 
And Russia’s growing military might could 
also indirectly restrict the scope of action 
of NATO and European Union in the shared 
neighbourhood. 
How should Germany and Europe re-
spond to changes in the Russian armed 
forces? First of all, there are important 
aspects where it is still crucial simply to 
obtain a better understanding of murky 
developments. Although the NATO-Russia 
Council has a working group where both 
sides regularly discuss individual issues 
of military development, greater Russian 
transparency is needed, especially on the 
“hard” aspects of the reform like arms mod-
ernisation and deployment of forces. But 
given Moscow’s tense relationship to NATO 
and the European Union, including the 
crisis of conventional arms control, uni-
lateral Russian concessions are unlikely 
here. 
But because the Russian military reforms 
are catching up many developments that 
Western armies themselves completed in the 
past two decades, Moscow certainly does 
possess an interest in mutual exchange in 
individual areas. This applies in the first 
place to “soft” issues such as training of 
NCOs, establishing a military police or 
changes in the medical and supply systems. 
Germany and the European states should 
respond to this interest of the Russian 
military leadership in order in this way to 
promote transparency and confidence-
building. 
Moreover, a Russia whose armed forces 
have been successfully modernised could 
become an interesting cooperation part-
ner for Western states. The stabilisation of 
Afghanistan and its northern periphery 
represents just one of the possible areas for 
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initiating greater collaboration. Even if a 
peacemaking or peacekeeping operation 
involving both Russia and NATO is current-
ly unthinkable, in the long run it makes 
sense to continue developing the concep-
tual and practical foundations for greater 
interoperability. This can build on shared 
KFOR experience in Kosovo and the ex-
changes in the scope of the NATO-Russia 
Council. 
For NATO, however, expanding military 
cooperation is a tricky matter, especially 
where it could contribute to improving 
the capacities of the Russian armed forces. 
Opinions concerning Moscow’s military 
reforms differ within NATO. Developments 
like increased Russian combat-readiness in 
connection with increased defence spend-
ing exacerbate traditional fears, especially 
among new members, and cause demands 
for a stronger NATO presence in these 
regions to grow louder. The other alliance 
members tend to feel less threatened. But 
Russia’s provocations and the enhanced 
capabilities of its armed forces are grounds 
enough to work more intensively in NATO 
for a shared understanding of the conse-
quences of its military reforms. 
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